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Abstract—The identification of game traffic in the Internet is 
very useful for a number of tasks. For trend analysis it is 
important to find out how much game traffic is in the Internet 
and how much traffic certain games contribute. To provide 
better than best effort QoS for game traffic in the network it is 
necessary to identify game traffic before it can be prioritised. 
Traditionally, network applications have been classified based on 
port numbers. It has been argued that purely relying on port 
numbers does result in significant number of unidentified flows 
for applications such as peer-to-peer file sharing and game 
traffic. While this has already been shown for peer-to-peer traffic 
no such studies exist for game traffic. In this paper we focus on 
one particular game and estimate how much of the traffic cannot 
be identified when solely relying on port number based 
identification. We find that the number of game flows using non-
default port numbers is significant. Our evaluation is based on 
real traffic captured at clients and public game servers.  
Keywords- Network Application Identification, Game Traffic 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, network applications have been 
classified based on port numbers but this approach is 
becoming more and more unreliable. The Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) [1] assigns the 
well-known ports from 0-1023 and registers port 
numbers in the range from 1024-49151. Many 
applications do not have IANA assigned or registered 
ports however and only utilise ‘well known’ default 
ports. Often these ports overlap with IANA ports and an 
unambiguous identification is no longer possible.  
A port database [2] that lists not only the IANA ports 
but also ports reported by users for different applications 
shows that many applications have overlapping ports in 
the IANA registered port range. As more and more 
applications emerge, this overlap will increase since the 
port number range is not likely to increase (this would 
require changing the UDP and TCP protocols). 
Even applications with well-known or registered 
ports can end up using different port numbers when 
users attempt to hide their existence or bypass port-based 
filters, or when multiple servers are sharing a single IP 
address (host). Furthermore some applications (e.g. 
passive FTP or video/voice communication) use 
dynamic ports unknowable in advance.  
This problem has been studied extensively in relation 
to peer-to-peer file sharing (p2p) applications. Incentives 
for reliable detection are very high for p2p. Many 
network operators attempt to block p2p traffic because 
of the large volume generated and/or the legal issues 
arising from copyright violations. Previous studies have 
shown that with pure port number based identification 
not all peer-to-peer traffic can be detected (for example 
see [3]). Recently network gaming has also become 
more prominent.  
The identification of game traffic in the Internet is 
very useful for a number of tasks. For trend analysis 
purposes it is important to find out how much game 
traffic is in the Internet and how much traffic certain 
games contribute. To provide better than best effort QoS 
for interactive games, game traffic needs to be identified 
before it can be prioritised (see [4]). Previous work has 
identified a number of shortfalls for pure port number 
based identification that could pose problems for game 
traffic [5].  
Online games usually have only a commonly known 
default port (but no IANA registered port), which means 
other applications are potentially using the same port 
numbers. Often multiple online game servers run on a 
single physical host (IP address), which means every 
server must run on a different port and therefore many 
servers run on non-default ports. On the client-side many 
players are behind Network Address Translation 
Gateways (NATs) that may change client port numbers.    
However, no empirical studies have been published 
yet on how efficient or inefficient port number based 
identification would be for game traffic. In this study we 
estimate the amount of game traffic that cannot be 
identified purely based on port numbers for a First 
Person Shooter (FPS) game called Enemy Territory (ET) 
[6] by studying ports used by clients and servers. We 
find that even if client and server port are utilised a 
significant number of flows (23%) cannot be detected.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II 
describes our approach including how we collected our 
datasets. Section III presents the results and section IV 
concludes and outlines future work. 
II. APPROACH 
We focus on ET as it is currently quite popular. The 
default port number for ET is 27960, which is the same 
as for Quake 3 (ET is actually a Quake 3 modification). 
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All FPS games use a very similar mechanism for 
letting players connect to servers. First a player’s game 
client retrieves a list of all available game servers from a 
so-called master server. Then the game client probes all 
servers on the list to retrieve information such as the 
number of players on the server, current map, latency to 
the server etc. (see [7] for more details). Finally the 
player chooses a server and connects to it. 
Since we are not able measure all ET traffic present 
in the Internet our strategy is as follows. We separately 
measure the port number distribution of a representative 
set of clients and the port number distribution of all 
servers. All network data is grouped into flows by using 
source/destination IP addresses and port numbers. Based 
on this we estimate the false negative rate for identifying 
ET traffic (ET flows not using the default port). It is 
impossible to estimate the false positive rate (other flows 
using the ET default port and therefore falsely identified 
as ET) because this would require knowledge about the 
port number distribution of all other traffic. 
In this paper we analyse two datasets that have been 
measured as part of CAIA’s GENIUS research program 
[8]. The datasets are described in the following two 
paragraphs. 
We have setup two public ET servers and have 
measured all incoming and outgoing traffic for 20 
weeks. One server is connected to our university 
network (CAIA server) and the other is connected to 
GrangeNets [9] high-speed network (GrangeNet server). 
The dataset is described in more detail in [7]. In [7] we 
have shown that at a public ET server a snapshot of the 
global player population can be observed when taking 
into consideration the many probe flows caused by 
clients probing the server. The reason is that the ET 
master server always sends the complete list of servers 
to a requesting client and the list is not ordered by server 
location (distance to the client). Thus we can use the 
data as a sample of the client port number distribution of 
the global ET player community. In the following we 
refer to this dataset as client ports dataset. 
To measure the port number distribution of all ET 
servers we have queried the ET master server every 30 
minutes for about 22 days. We recorded all server 
information, including the port numbers the servers run 
on. The total number of servers was fairly stable during 
the measurement period at around 3,000 servers. This 
dataset and its collection are described in more detail in 
[10]. In the following we refer to this dataset as server 
ports dataset. 
III.  RESULTS 
Figure 1 shows the Cumulative Density Functions 
(CDFs) of the whole port number distributions of both 
client ports datasets and the server ports dataset. The 
figure shows that client ports are widely distributed 
across the whole range. Only for 55%-60% of the flows 
was the client port equal to the default port.  
We believe the client port distribution is mainly 
caused by Network Address Translation Gateways 
(NATs). The game client always uses the default port 
but the port number is likely to be changed if clients are 
behind NATs (as suggested in [11]). Some NATs 
however do not change the port number unless they have 
to because the port is already in use. But if the port is 
changed it is usually changed to a random number not 
necessarily very close to the default port. 
Distributions observed at both servers are very 
similar. The server port distribution apparently only has 
about 15%-20% of the servers running on the default 
port. 





















Figure 1: Cummulative distribution of port numbers 
This is not the case however, as we zoom in on the 
default port (see Figure 2). Now we can see that in fact 
roughly 50% of the servers were running on non-default 
port numbers. 30% of the non-default ports are larger but 
very close to the default port. 





















Figure 2: Cummulative distribution of port numbers zoomed in on 
the default port 
The server port distribution is different because it is 
far less spread out across the port number space. Most 
non-default ports are higher but very close the default 
port. This is probably because multiple servers are 
running on one IP address (this could be a single 
physical box, a load balancer in front of multiple servers 
etc.). If started after each other servers automatically 
obtain the next available port number higher than the 
default port. If manually configured server 
administrators are likely to select port numbers that are 
very close to the default port. A similar effect was 
observed in [12] for server ports of the FPS game Half-
Life. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the distributions of the 
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overall datasets. To investigate how the percentage 
changes over time we have grouped all flows measured 
at both servers into hourly time intervals and computed 
the percentage of flows not having default client ports 
for each hour. Figure 3 shows the CDFs of the 
percentages. 




















Figure 3: CDFs of hourly percentage of client flows using non-
default ports 
The figure shows that the percentage is not constant 
but changes between 35% and 70% for most hours. The 
distributions are quite similar for both servers.  
Figure 4 shows the CDF of the per 30 minutes 
percentage of servers that are not using the default port. 
Above we found that if servers are not running on the 
default port, often their port number is very close to the 
default. Therefore, we introduced a distance parameter d 
that simply specifies the range (27960-d, 27960+d). We 
treat all ports within the range as if they would be the 
default ET port. This means for d=0 we only accept 
27960 as default port, whereas for larger d we accept a 
whole range of ports.  






















Figure 4: CDFs of half hourly percentage of servers running on non-
default port 
The CDFs are very steep as we encounter only little 
variation of the percentage during the measurement 
period. The distance parameter has a large impact on the 
percentage for smaller d values, but the impact is rapidly 
decreasing for larger d. For identification based on port 
numbers only, it would be obviously beneficial to set d 
between 10 and 50 to greatly reduce the number of 
unknown ports (from 50% down to ~17%). However, if 
any other applications use ports in these ranges the 
number of false positives would also increase. 
If only the server port is used for identification the 
false negative rate would be expected to be between 
15% and 50% depending on d (d>0 is likely to cause 
false positives though). If the client port is also used we 
estimate the false negative rate based on both port 
distributions. However, because many clients are behind 
NATs that potentially map ports of other application to 
the default ET port, this would also lead to an increased 
false positive rate.  
Assuming the percentages in the CDFs reflect the 
probabilities of clients and servers to use non-default 
ports, both probabilities are independent and clients 
choose servers randomly we can simply estimate a joint 
probability using the product of the two probabilities. On 
average 45% of flows have non-default client ports. 
With d=0 the false negative rate could be decreased to 
23% (50% non-default server ports) whereas d=50 
would reduce the false negative rate further down to 8% 
(17% non-default server ports). Again, this decrease in 
false negatives is very likely to come at the price of an 
increased number of false positives. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we investigate if game traffic can be 
identified purely based on port numbers. Our study is 
built around a currently popular first person shooter 
game. We have measured representative client port 
distribution and server port distributions. Based on these 
distributions the percentage of game flows not 
identifiable is between 50% and 8%. However, small 
false negative rates can only be achieved with a very 
likely increase in false positives. We conclude that a 
significant fraction of the traffic cannot be detected 
purely based on port numbers. 
Obviously it is interesting to expand this work to 
different games and/or different game types (e.g. real-
time strategy. We believe results for other first person 
shooter games could be similar since all FPS games are 
based on the same client, server and master server 
architecture. However, for other game types that use 
different mechanisms (e.g. peer-to-peer) results could be 
totally different. 
Since port numbers seems to be inaccurate for 
detecting game traffic (as we demonstrated for one 
popular game) the question is how game traffic could be 
more reliably detected? 
Payload-based identification provides very high 
accuracies. It can be further divided into protocol 
decoding and signature-based identification. With 
protocol decoding the classifier actually decodes the 
application protocol, while signature-based methods 
search for application specific byte sequences in the 
payload. However, payload-based classification relies on 
specific application data, making it difficult to detect a 
wide range of applications or stay up to date with new 
applications. Since most game protocols are not openly 
specified this would require at lot of reverse engineering. 
In addition, the process of creating rules for signature-
based classification must often be done by hand, which 
can be very time consuming. 
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Another promising alternative proposed more 
recently is to use machine learning [13] and classify 
flows based on payload-independent statistical flow 
attributes such as packet length or inter-arrival time 
distributions. In CAIA’s DSTC project [14] we currently 
evaluate the effectiveness of this approach.  
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